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INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the carcenogenic effect of asbestos has resulted in
thousands of personal injury and wrongful death actions by and on behalf of
persons exposed to asbestos. As a result, public concern has arisen over the
exposure of school children and school employees to this hazardous material. In order to safeguard the health of the children, teachers, and employees, and to protect school districts from possible liability,' asbestos
1. See Asbestos Scare That Stalks the Schools, 96 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 26,
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abatement procedures, which involve finding and covering, or removing and
replacing the materials containing asbestos, have become necessary. The
high cost of such procedures, 2 however, is leading some school boards and
school districts to pursue legal remedies to cover the expense of abating
materials containing asbestos in schools. 3 Although no suits have, as yet,
come to trial, a South Carolina school district recently settled with an asbestos defendant for $675,000.' As public concern and knowledge of the school
asbestos hazard increases, more abatement suits become likely. This comment will focus on three key issues in school asbestos abatement litigation:
the manufacturer's knowledge of asbestos hazards, proof of an injury in fact,

1984, at 13 (educators bracing for suits from former students contracting cancer); School Districts Face Suits Over Asbestos Pollution, Wall St. J., Mar. 5, 1984, at 7, col. I (Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) considering civil action against schools not dealing with asbestos
problem).
2. See Schools Peg Asbestos Fix at $1.4 Billion, ENGINEERING NEWS REC., Oct. 20, 1983,

at 12 (United States Department of Education estimates total cost at $1.4 billion); Silas, Asbestos-free, 71 A.B.A.J., Apr. 1985, at 22, 22 (asbestos removal in Baltimore school system has
cost $1.5 million).
3. See Silas, Asbestos-free, 71 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, at 22, 22 (85 school suits filed); More
Than 40 School DistrictsHave Filed Property Damage Lawsuits, ASBESTOS LITIGATION REP.

(ANDREWS) 9253, 9253-59 (Nov. 16, 1984) (alphabetical listing by state of suits filed). The
known filings in Texas are: Dayton Indep. School Dist. v. United States Gypsum, No. B-81277 (E.D. Tex. filed May 22, 1981) (consolidated with Evadale Indep. School Dist. v. United
States Gypsum, No. B-81-293); Kirbyville Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum, No.
12,301 (Dist. Ct. of Jasper County, 1st Judicial Dist. of Texas, filed June 28, 1983); Livingston
Indep. School Dist. v. National Gypsum, No. 9776 (Dist. Ct. of Polk County, 9th Judicial
Dist. of Texas, filed June 3, 1983). In addition to the individual suits, a voluntary national
class of school plaintiffs against asbestos manufacturing defendants has been certified for the
recovery of asbestos hazard abatement costs. See In re Asbestos School Litig., No. 83-0268-40,
at 36 (E.D. Penn. Memorandum Opinion and Order, filed Sept. 28, 1984), reprintedin ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9051, 9059 (Oct. 5, 1984). The court also certified a mandatory
national class for the limited issue of punitive damages. See id. at 36. The mandatory class is
conditional, however, in that any school has the option to withdraw from the punitive-damage
class and negotiate settlement. Any settlement reached will be credited to the asbestos defendants if and when punitive damages are awarded to the mandatory class. See id. at 36. In
certifying the class action, the court reasoned that a class disposition of issues will realize great
savings to both parties because the litigation will be centralized in a single forum, "thereby
economizing litigation expenses." See id. at 23. The court reasoned that the compensatorydamage class should be optional because the interest of larger school districts could be better
served by pursuing their own actions. See id. at 25. Other districts, however, will benefit from
the class forum because the complex litigation could generate more expense than the anticipated recovery. While recovery for compensatory damages is best achieved on a voluntary
basis, the punitive-damage class is mandatory; because of the defendants' limited resources,
recoveries in earlier suits could possibly impair and impede the opportunity for other districts
to recover punitive damages. See id. at 26.
4. See Asbestos Industry Is Likely to Spend More Time in Court, Wall St. J., Apr. 16,
1984, at 22, col. 2.
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and recovering for the cost of removal and replacement of the asbestos material in tort.
II.

GENERAL BACKGROUND-ASBESTOS HAZARDS

Asbestos is the generic name for naturally occurring minerals which separate into fiber.5 Because of its tensile strength, fire resistancy, and thermal
and sound insulation qualities, asbestos, for many years,6 served as a popular
building material in schools.7 Of the 31,000 schools containing asbestos,'
most house "friable" asbestos-a soft or loosely bound mixture susceptible
to easy destruction.9 Thus, as school buildings age and experience wear and
tear, asbestos fibers are released into the environment and inhaled by the
building's inhabitants.' 0 Microscopic particles and dust emitted from the

5. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at A1-A2 (1980). Asbestos occurs in six major mineral
forms: actinolite, amosite, anthophyllite, chrysotile, crocidolite, and tremolite. See id. at A2A4.
6. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 1 (Aug.
31, 1982). Asbestos was used extensively in school building construction between 1946 and
1972. See id. at 1. In 1973, the EPA banned the spraying of asbestos for insulating and
fireproofing. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.22(d) (1973). In 1978, the EPA widened its ban to include all
spray applications for any purpose. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.22(e) (1978) (for current EPA asbestos
rules, see 40 C.F.R. § 61.148, .150 (1984)); see also Second Wave Of Litigation Hits Asbestos,
NAT'L L.J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 1 (basic building material until outlawed by EPA).
7. See Oversight Hearings on Asbestos Health Hazards to School Children: Hearings on
H.R. 1435 and H.R. 1524 Before the Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational
Education of the House of Representatives Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. 178-79 (1979) (statement of James P. Leineweber, Ph.D.); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 1 (Aug. 31, 1982) (asbestos valued for
"fireproofing, insulating, and acoustical properties and tensile strength"). In school buildings,
the asbestos materials are found in floor tiles, support beams, and ceilings. See U.S. DEPT. OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS

47

(Sept. 21, 1981).
8. See Transcript, ABC World News Tonight, Sept. 5, 1984 (transcript available from
American Broadcasting Corporation).
9. See EPA Assesses Penaltyfor Asbestos Violations, 10 EPA J., Apr. 1984, at 17. Friable
asbestos material can be crumbled by hand or on contact. See id. at 17. The friability depends
upon the other "components mixed with the asbestos and the amount of cement" (mixture
adhesive) added. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 47 (SEPT. 21, 1981).
10. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JU rICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 47-50 (Sept. 21, 1981). Machine vibrations and direct contact also
cause a breakdown of the friable asbestos and a release of dust. See id. at 47. The EPA lists
common activities which may damage exposed asbestos material, inducing fiber fallout:
1. A ball hitting friable material on a gymnasium ceiling or wall.
2. Hanging pictures or displays on friable materials.
3. Any maintenance activity involving contact with friable material.
4. Water damage from roof or plumbing leaks will cause deterioration . ...
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asbestos fiber are known to cause cancer in humans,'1 and the United States
Congress has determined that the presence of friable asbestos poses a health
hazard to school children.' 2

5. Building vibrations from sources within or outside the building, including activities
on the floor above, or from machinery which can cause movement of friable materials and
release of fibers.
6. Vandalism caused by scraping or gouging causing the release of asbestos fibers.
Id. at 48 n.72 (citing 3 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [Asbestos-Containing
Materialsin School Buildings: A GuidanceDocument], pt. I, at 4 (1979)). Once released, their
very small size causes the fibers and dust to remain airborne for an extended period of time.
See id. at 48 (citing 3 U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY [Asbestos-Containing
Materialsin School Buildings: A Guidance Document], pt. I, at 2-4 (1979)). Further, once the
dust and particles do settle they may become resuspended into the environment from custodial
and student activity. See id. at 49.
11. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982).
Legal and medical literature has firmly established that asbestos can cause cancer-associated
diseases. See id. at 544; see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A
DILEMMA 1 (Aug. 31, 1982) (noting that the World Health Organization's International
Agency for Research on Cancer lists asbestos as one of 18 cancer-causing chemicals). The
diseases associated with asbestos exposure include asbestosis, lung cancer, and mesothelioma.
See G.

PETERS

& B.

PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES:

MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND

at B1-Bl (1980). Asbestosis is a non-malignant condition produced
from inhaling high levels of asbestos fiber. See id. at B2. Asbestosis results in fiberous tissue
growth in a human's lungs, and manifestations include shortness of breath, basal lung noises,
coughing, club fingers, and skin discoloration. See id. at B4-B5. In the most severe forms,
death may result. See id. at B2. Although lung cancer also results in humans not exposed to
asbestos, moderate asbestos exposure increases the risk of lung cancer five to 10 times. See id.
at B8. One problem associated with determining hazardous exposure levels and resulting lung
cancer is the cancer's long latency period. Usually, the time between initial exposure and
cancer evidence falls between 15 and 40 years. See id. at B8. A third disease associated with
asbestos exposure is mesothelioma, a painful, diffuse cancer spreading over the lung surface
and/or surface of the stomach lining. See id. at B6-B7. Based on medical studies, the occurrence of mesothelioma is associated with a very low level, non-occupational exposure to asbestos. See id. at B7.
12. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 401 l(a)(2) (West Supp. III 1984) ("medical evidence has suggested
that children may be particularly vulnerable to environmentally induced cancers"); id.
§ 4011 (a)(6) ("the presence in school buildings of friable or easily damaged asbestos creates an
unwarranted hazard to the health of the school children and school employees who are exposed to such materials"). But see Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in
Schools, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1. The article stated that
school children are "unlikely to experience increased health risks" from exposure. See id. at
29A. Further, Dr. Thomas L. Kurt, clinical associate professor of internal medicine at the
University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas, states, "the issue of [asbestos] exposure to
school children is greatly out of proportion to the actual danger." See id. at 29A. Moreover,
federal district Judge James M. Kelly, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, who currently presides over a national asbestos-abatement class action suit, listed the "general health hazard of
asbestos" exposure in schools as a common question of fact when certifying the class action.
See Common Questions of Fact Are at Core of Asbestos School Litigation, ASBESTOS LITIG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 9402, 9403 (Dec. 21, 1984).
ENGINEERING ASPECTS,
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Since 1982, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has required school districts to conduct inspections to determine if asbestos materials are present. 13 Although not all asbestos discoveries require action, the
EPA has failed to specify guidelines for determining when abatement is necessary. 4 Consequently, most school districts pursue some form of abatement procedure upon discovery of asbestos material. I" For schools that pay
the cost of abatement, the Asbestos School Hazard Abatement Act of 198416

13. See 40 C.F.R. § 763.100 (1984). The EPA order directs "local education agencies" to
identify friable asbestos by visually inspecting, sampling, and analyzing the samples. See id.
The rule further commands school districts to provide warnings concerning asbestos hazards
and instructions on asbestos avoidance by school employees and for notification to parentteacher organizations of the inspection results. See id. As of November 1984, the EPA had
issued 56 civil penalities for noncompliance with its inspection order, including a $238,000 fine
levied against schools within New York City. See Flaherty, Second Wave Of Litigation Hits
Asbestos, NAT'L. L.J., Oct. 29, 1984, at 1, col. 1, 24, col. 1. The EPA intends to fine any school
that fails to inform the parents about asbestos hazards confronting their children. See EPA
Assesses Penalty ForAsbestos Violations, 10 EPA J., Apr. 1984, at 17 (statement of Alvin Alm,
EPA Deputy Administrator).
14. See C. COPELAND, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION,
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MAJOR ISSUE SYSTEM, BRIEF No. 1B83160, ASBEsTOS IN SCHOOLS: PROGRAM AND POLICY ISSUES 4 (Apr. 26, 1984). The EPA maintains that

no rating system or hazard index exists to assist school officials in classifying their asbestos
hazard. See id. at 4. The EPA attempted to develop a standard, but a draft of such was
criticized as failing to be a reliable measure of the non-occupational exposure hazard. See An
Assessment of the EnvironmentalProtection Agency's Asbestos HazardEvaluation Algorithm, 73
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH, Oct. 1983, at 1179, 1180-81. The lack of clear guidelines on when to
abate and at what level exposure becomes hazardous has led to criticisms of the EPA program.
See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 7, 18 (Aug. 31,

1981). The absence of definitive criteria has also led some school districts to overreact to
asbestos material, while other districts underreact, failing to adequately respond to the hazard.
See id. at 18-19. The EPA's failure to set definitive guidelines has prompted a suit against the
agency. See Union Sues EPA for Failing to Address Dangers in Schools, MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: ASBESTOS (MEALEY) 1142, 1142-43 (Sept. 14, 1984). The suit, brought by the Service

Employees International Union, seeks to force the EPA to establish standards for determining
when the need for hazard correction exists. See id. at 1142.
15. See Westbrook, See You in Court. AM. SCH. & U., Jan. 1984, at 14. The EPA suggests four varying abatement procedures: (1) total removal, most costly but also most permanent; (2) enclosure, "constructing an airtight barrier around the asbestos material";
(3) encapsulation, coating material to prevent fiber release; (4) deferred action, supplemented
with regular inspection when exposure levels are negligible. See C. COPELAND, ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES POLICY DIVISION, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE,
MAJOR ISSUE SYSTEM, BRIEF No. 1B83160, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: PROGRAM AND POLICY

IssuES 4 (Apr. 26, 1984). EPA surveys indicate that two-thirds of the schools with asbestos
problems have taken corrective action or are in the process of taking corrective action. See
HearingsHeld on Adequacy of Federal Efforts to Control Asbestos Hazards, ASBESTOS LITlG.
REP. (ANDREWS) 9026, 9027 (Oct. 5, 1984).

16. 20 U.S.C.A. § 4011-4021 (West Supp. l1 1984).
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provides money grants and loans.1" However, like earlier federal asbestos
abatement efforts, the Act offers ineffective relief to schools.'" Litigation,
therefore, provides an alternative for the recovery of the cost and damage
incurred in asbestos abatement procedures. 1 9
III.

MANUFACTURER'S KNOWLEDGE OF ASBESTOS HAZARDS

An important issue that has emerged in school asbestos abatement litigation is whether a manufacturer's knowledge of the asbestos health hazard
and the foreseeability of danger to school inhabitants imposed a duty upon
the manufacturer to warn the school boards of the asbestos dangers.2" The

17. See id. § 4014. As provided within the Act, the program is to be administered by the
EPA. See id. § 4012(a)(1). The Act establishes $600 million for abatement costs, $50 million
of which is appropriated for fiscal year 1985. See id. § 4021(a). The law provides up to 100%
of the cost of abatement and is interest free for 20 years. See id. § 4014(e), (f). If a loan is
inadequate, the Act authorizes a grant which is not to exceed 50% of the total abatement cost.
See id. § 4014(e)(1). The loans and grants are based on financial need. See id. § 4014(c)(l)-(3).
18. See McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 33 (federal government "all talk and no action" regarding asbestos school hazard). In hearings before the House
Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Transportation and Commerce, John A. Moore,
EPA assistant administrator for Pesticides and Toxic Substances, testified that the Act is
"likely to be counter-productive" because school districts would begin competing for the federal funds instead of moving quickly on their own. See HearingHeld on Adequacy of Federal
Efforts to ControlAsbestos Hazards, ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9026, 9027 (Oct. 5,
1984). Previous federal attempts to remedy the asbestos hazard "[have] not inspired an effective government response in the form of either regulation or action." See Anderson, II &
Nido, Responding to the Threatof Asbestos-ContainingMaterialsin School Buildings, INQUIRY
& ANALYSIS, Nov. 1982, at 1, 2. The Asbestos School Hazard Detection and Control Act of
1980 failed to provide a "workable solution" to the asbestos problem because it failed to require the removal of asbestos, and its monetary assistance program was never funded. See id.
at 3; see also 20 U.S.C. § 3601 (1982).
19. See U.S. DEP'T. OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS, at vii (Sept. 21, 1981) (litigation should be investigated); see also
McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 33, 35 (suggesting that until

South Carolina settlement, bankruptcy petition of Johns-Manville had cast "pallor" over
chances of recovery). Citing the expense of personal injury awards against the company,
Johns-Manville, in August 1982, filed for reorganization under Chapter I1. See Manville Files
for Bankruptcy, Citing Mounting Litigating Costs, ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 5397,

5397 (Aug. 27, 1982). Settlements and awards against the asbestos manufacturer totaled over
$34 million in 1981 and had reached $27 million when the company applied for reorganization
in August 1982. See Chen, Asbestos Litigation Is a Growth Industry, 254 ATLANTIC, July
1984, at 30. In addition to outstanding personal injury claims, Johns-Manville faces over $1
billion in property-damage claims. See Asbestos Claims Against Manville Exceed $1 Billion,
Wall St. J., Jan. 31, 1985, at 3, col. 1. Besides Johns-Manville, Amatex Corporation and UNR
Industries, Inc., have also applied for Chapter 11 reorganization. See Chen, Asbestos Litigation
Is a Growth Industry, 254 ATLANTIC, July 1984, at 24, 26.
20. See Common Questions of Fact Are at Core of Asbestos School Litigation, ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9402, 9403 (Dec. 21. 1984).
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manufacturer is held to the standard of an expert, which requires at the
minimum that he keep abreast of scientific discoveries, knowledge, and advances and understand the information available. 2 1 Thus, to determine what
the asbestos manufacturer knew or should have known requires an assessment of the medical and scientific evidence available 22 at the time the
schools purchased the asbestos material. In short, the issue becomes what
the asbestos manufacturer knew and when the manufacturer obtained such
knowledge.
A. Knowledge in OccupationalExposure Cases
In a leading asbestos personal injury case involving the knowledge of an
asbestos manufacturer, the Fifth Circuit, in Borel v. FiberboardPaperProducts Corp.,23 concluded that the danger of working with asbestos was recognized as early as the 1920's and 1930's and that the "deadly relationship"
between asbestosis and insulation work was confirmed in a 1961 report.24 In
another suit involving an asbestos personal injury claim, it was determined
that the asbestos industry had remained silent concerning the relationship
21. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); Keeton, Products Liability-ProblemsPertainingto Proofof
Negligence, 19 Sw. L.J. 26, 30-33 (1965).
22. See Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 885 (1983). Medical, scientific, or technical evidence pertaining to the state of knowledge in respect to a product
at the time when the product is manufactured and designed is referred to as "state of the art"
evidence. See id. at 885. In products liability actions, the issue arises whether state of the art
evidence is admissible under a strict liability theory. See Beshada v. Johns-Manville Prods.
Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 542 (N.J. 1982) (refused to admit state of art in asbestos personal injury
case). It is argued that the introduction of information reasonably known undercuts strict
liability by equating it with a negligence standard. See id. at 549; Comment, Issues in Asbestos
Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 886 (1983); accord Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp.,
493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973) (coincides with negligence standard), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 869 (1974). Moreover, refusing to admit state of the art evidence advances the policies of
risk spreading and accident avoidance that strict liability seeks to achieve. See Beshada v.
Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 447 A.2d 539, 547-49 (N.J. 1982). In contrast, proponents of
state of the art evidence rely on § 402A, comment j, on strict liability, which requires that a
manufacturer give warning of a product's dangerousness if he knows or should know of the
danger. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965). If state of the art
evidence was excluded, strict liability of a manufacturer would become absolute liability. See
Comment, Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 871, 888 (1983). In Texas, the rule
appears settled that state of the art evidence is relevant and admissible in asbestos-related
cases. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 344 (5th Cir. 1982) ("strict
liability because of failure to warn" based on manufacturer's reasonable knowledge); Borel v.
Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1088 (5th Cir 1973)(plaintiff alleged product
unreasonably dangerous because manufacturer failed to warn of known dangers), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 869 (1974).
23. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied. 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
24. See id. at 1106.
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between asbestos and mesothelioma,2 5 which was known since the 1930's.26
Finally, the Sixth Circuit, in rejecting an asbestos manufacturer's appeal on
the sufficiency of the evidence, cited to the deposition testimony of the manufacturer's medical director, which indicated the manufacturer's early
knowledge of the hazard. 27 Although the manufacturer did not begin warning until 1964, the manufacturer's medical director stated that he was aware
of the association between fiber inhalation and cancer by the late 1940's;
aware of the "cancer hazard" from inhalation in the late 1950's; and in 1952,
his recommendation for the use of warning labels was rejected for purely
business reasons.28
B.

EstablishingKnowledge of Hazards in Schools

Establishing that the asbestos manufacturers were or should have been
aware of asbestos health hazards would support the schools' contention that
the manufacturers breached a duty owed to the schools by failing to warn of
the dangers associated with asbestos exposure.2 9 School plaintiffs could seek
to establish the manufacturer's knowledge of the danger and the foreseeability of harm from exposure on the basis of judicial findings in asbestos personal injury cases.3 ° In contrast, asbestos defendants could argue that since
the personal injury cases involved workers who were exposed to high levels
of fiber concentration, such knowledge cannot be equated with a knowledge
of the alleged danger emanating from lower level fiber exposure in schools.3 1
Commentators, however, suggest that evidence establishes that the manufac-

25. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,
LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at B6 (1980) (cancer associated with low level asbestos
exposure). No safe exposure level has been determined, and it is best prevented by "avoiding
exposure to asbestos." See id. at B7.
26. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982)

(mesothelioma and asbestos relationship known since 1930's).
27. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 814 (6th Cir. 1982) (testimony of Dr. Kenneth Smith, Johns-Manville's former medical director).
28. See id.at 814.
29. See Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace &
Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 12, In re Asbestos School Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L., Dec. 6, 1984), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413, 9417 (Dec. 21, 1984); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (once knowledge established, duty to warn imposed).
30. See Karjala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975)
(imputing knowledge of asbestos hazards in one situation to another situation involving lesser
degree of exposure).
31. Cf Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace &
Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer For Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 12, In re
School Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 6, 1984) (issue of
whether reasonable to require manufacturer to warn based on "an extrapulation from [manufacturer's] alleged knowledge of the health hazards attributable to occupational exposure to
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turers took affirmative actions to suppress and manipulate unfavorable conclusions concerning asbestos danger, while also soliciting scientific findings
favorable to asbestos. 32 As support, commentators point to various communications which suggest that asbestos officials were less than candid in informing the public of the risk documented by their studies, and attempted to

impede the dissemination of other relevant data concerning asbestos health
hazards.3 3 Such allegations, if proven, could establish that the manufacturer, in its expert status, failed in its duty to keep abreast of scientific dis-

high concentration levels of fibers"), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413,
9417 (Dec. 21, 1984).
32. See, e.g., Chen, Asbestos LitigationIs a Growth Industry, 254 ATLANTIC, July 1984, at
24 (failed to take reports seriously, later worked to conceal evidence); Motley, The Lid Comes
Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 21 (denial of problem and solicitation of favorable evidence); Westbrook, Asbestos in the Schools 5, 6 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript obtained from author; condensed version, Asbestos in the Schools, WISC. SCH. NEWS, Dec. 1983, at 7) (asbestos industry
actively concealed information rather than encouraging further research).

33. See, e.g., U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 34-45A (Sept. 21, 1981) (documents taken from asbestos personal
injury litigation); Motley, The Lid Comes Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 21, 21-24 (letters and
minutes of asbestos meetings); Westbrook, Asbestos in the Schools 6 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript obtained from author; condensed version, Asbestos in the Schools, WISC. SCH. NEWS,
Dec. 1983, at 7) (documents and letters between asbestos industry officials). An example of
such conduct is a letter dated September 25, 1935, from the editor of Asbestos, a trade magazine, to an asbestos manufacturing company president, requesting permission to print an article concerning the hazards of abestos based on a British experiment. See Motley, The Lid
Comes Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 21. The editor noted that in the past, the asbestos official had
"requested that for certain obvious reasons we publish nothing and naturally your wishes have
been respected" but that with the proper focus, the British experiment could be used favorably.
See id. at 21. The article, however, was not published, and in a letter from the company
president to an officer of Johns-Manville, the official praised Asbestos for not publishing the
article, noting " 'the less said about asbestos the better off we are.' " See id. at 22. In response,
the Johns-Manville officer wrote, " 'I quite agree with you that our interests are best served by

having asbestosis receive the minimum of publicity.'" See U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 36 (Sept. 21, 1981). A

further example of asbestos manufacturers' disregard for imparting relevant information concerns the conduct of Johns-Manville after reviewing results of an experiment, which concluded
that 75% of their workers tested had differing degrees of fibrosis in their lungs. See id. at 38.
The workers, in order to keep their spirits and productivity up, were not told of the findings.
See Motley, The Lid Comes Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 24. On the basis of the Manville-worker
study and other reports, and the company's nonaction, schools could argue that the medical
and the public's knowledge of asbestos hazards could have been significantly advanced "if the
results of the study had been disseminated." See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATrORNEY
GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 40 (Sept. 21, 1981). For a listing of documents and communications between industry officials, see Motley, The Lid Comes
Off, TRIAL, Apr. 1980, at 60. For a general discussion of the documents and possible interpretations favorable to a school plaintiff, see U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE A"rORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
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coveries, knowledge, and advances.3 4
C.

Imposing a Duty to Warn

Once a school establishes the manufacturer's knowledge of asbestos health
hazards, the issue becomes whether the danger to school inhabitants and the
school building was foreseeable by the manufacturer, thereby imposing a
duty to warn. 35 In resolving an analogous issue, the Eighth Circuit affirmed
a jury instruction which allowed the jury to consider whether the known
danger to an insulation worker exposed to a high level of fiber concentration
put the asbestos manufacturer on notice of the danger to an installation
worker exposed to a lower level of fiber concentration. 36 Schools could argue that the known hazards associated with occupational exposure made
harm from non-occupational exposure foreseeable.3 7 Moreover, even if the
likelihood of disease from non-industrial exposure was not as great, a duty to
warn was still present. 38 In situtations involving potentially dangerous prod34. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1089-90 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). Borel establishes that the manufacturer must stay informed
of all medical and scientific information and use such information to provide a non-dangerous
product. If the manufacturers withheld and obscured information, as commentators suggest,
then they would have failed the Borel test. Cf id. at 1089-90. It should be noted that the
communications and documents could be subject to authenticity disputes and differing interpretations. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY

REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 35A, 45A (Sept. 21, 1981).
35. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment j (1965) (if seller has
knowledge or should have knowledge of product's danger, then must warn of danger).
36. See Kaijala v. Johns-Manville Prods. Corp., 523 F.2d 155, 158-59 (8th Cir. 1975).
The jury instruction informed the jury that the manufacturer would be liable, under the expert
standard, it if failed to disclose those dangers "inherent in its product that the application of
reasonable foresight would reveal." See id. at 159.
37. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE AT-rORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 140-42 (Sept. 21, 1981). The report argues that on the basis of foreseeability of harm, a school plaintiff should at least "get to the jury" that knowledge of
industrial dangers created a duty to test and warn of exposure danger in schools. See id. at
141-42. Regarding the foreseeability of harm, the Borel court determined that "[a] product
must not be made available to the public without disclosure of those dangers that the application of reasonable foresight would reveal." See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493
F.2d 1076, 1090 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974). The Restatement (Second)
of Torts provides that where dangerous but useful products are marketed, warnings must accompany the sale. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment § k (1965). Borel applied comment k to commercial products, such as asbestos, which possess "unparalleled
utility" and "unquestioned danger." See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d
1076, 1088 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974).
38. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 129-30 (9th Cir. 1968). Wyeth holds
that warnings must accompany the product when the qualitive risk of the product, such as
death or disease, as well as the quantitative risk, calls "for a true choice judgment" on whether
to use the product. See id. 129-30; see also W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 31, at 171 (5th ed. 1984) ("As gravity of the possible harm increases, the apparent
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ucts, the Ninth Circuit has determined that a statistical chance of one-in-amillion that harm might occur imposes a duty to warn.39
Some asbestos manufacturers did begin warning in 1964, 4' claiming the
asbestos health hazards had not been documented until that time." Inadequacy of the warnings, however, remains a ground upon which the manufacturers could be attacked. 2 Additionally, schools could argue that proper
warnings would have materially influenced their decision to use the material
containing asbestos. 3 Having established that asbestos manufacturers knew
or should have known that exposure in schools could cause injury, it becomes imperative for schools to demonstrate that exposure to asbestos did,
in fact, cause an injury.
IV.

PROOF OF INJURY IN FACT

Nothwithstanding a United States congressional finding that the presence

likelihood of its occurrence need be correspondingly less to generate a duty of precaution.").

Thus, schools could argue that since the risk of death or disease is present, no matter how
slight, warnings are required. Even though school exposure is less than industrial exposure,
such lessening fails to reduce the overall risk. See McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD
J., Apr. 1984, at 33. "'[S]cientific evidence suggests that there is no safe dose of asbestos. Any
exposure, no matter how small, will increase the risk of cancer.'" Id. at 33 (quoting Edwin C.
Holstein, Clinical Assistant Professor, Environmental Science Laboratories of Mount Sinai
School of Medicine, New York).
39. See Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121, 128-29 (9th Cir. 1968).
40. See G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL,

LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at E16 (1980). The following dates are alleged to be
when the manufacturers began to warn: Johns-Manville, Eagle-Picher, and Owens Corning1964; Fiberboard Paper Products and Rubberoid-1966; Pittsburg Corning-1968; Keene1969; Celotex (formerly Philip Carey)--1971; and Amatex, H.K. Porter, and Raybestos-Manhattan-1972. See id. at E16.
41. See Moran v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 691 F.2d 811, 815 (6th Cir. 1982). JohnsManville argued that it was not until a 1964 study on asbestos hazards that it was aware of the
hazards to users of products containing asbestos. See id. at 815. The court found, however,
that Johns-Manville's assertion was "belied" by the study itself. See id. at 815.
42. See Borel v. Fiberboard Paper Prods. Corp., 493 F.2d 1076, 1104 (5th Cir. 1973)
(manufacturer's "caution" conveyed no idea of extent of danger; admonition to avoid breathing dust constituted "black humor"), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974); G. PETERS & B. PETERS, SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ENGINEERING
ASPECTS, at E16 (1980) (after warnings given, question became "were warnings adequate and
sufficient").
43. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY RE-

PORT TO THE CONGRESS 143 (Sept. 21, 1981) (if warned, districts would not have allowed
installation); accord Westbrook, Asbestos in the Schools 10 (n.d.) (unpublished manuscript obtained from author- condensed version at Asbestos in the Schools, WIS. SCH. NEWS, Dec. 1983,
at 7) (manufacturer failed to communicate truth to those with right to know).
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of friable asbestos in schools poses a health hazard," whether the hazard
from exposure constitutes an injury in fact remains a key issue for determination in school asbestos abatement litigation.4 5 As plaintiffs, schools must
demonstrate an injury in fact in order to recover for abatement costs and
damages.4 6 The issue of injury from school exposure is clouded, however, by
conflicting medical, scientific, and legal findings, which disagree as to the
level of risk associated with non-industrial exposure.47 The issue is further
compounded because there is no specific criteria to determine when the hazard from exposure to materials containing asbestos necessitates abatement,
even though legislation requires it.4" Thus, school boards and asbestos de-

44. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 401 l(a)(6) (West Supp. III 1984). The congressional finding concludes that the hazard is "unwarranted." See id.
45. See Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace &
Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 3, In re School
Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 6, 1984), reprinted in ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413 (Dec. 21, 1984). Federal District Judge James Kelley, who
currently presides over an asbestos hazard abatement class action suit, was the first to list the
level of risk from school exposure as a key issue in school litigation. See Common Questions of
FactAre at Core of Asbestos School Litigation, ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9402, 9402
(Dec. 21, 1984).
46. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY RE-

PORT TO THE CONGRESS 91 (Sept. 21, 1981) (plaintiff's first task to prove injury); accord W.
PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 103, at 712-13 (5th ed. 1984) (recovery
based on injury).
47. Compare Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn.
1982) ("mesothelioma may result from one exposure to asbestos dust or fiber") and U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 32 (Sept. 21, 1981) (quoting J.C. Gilson, Asbestos Cancer: Past & Future Hazards, 66
Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 398, 400 (1973)) (reports of diagnosed mesothelioma following short exposure period of few weeks) with Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos
Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1 ("'There
is no serious or substantial risk to schoolchildren' ") (quoting Thomas L. Kurt, Associate Professor of Internal Medicine, University of Texas Health Science Center at Dallas) and Brief of
National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace & Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 10, In re School Asbestos Litigation,
No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 6, 1984) (" 'the risk which asbestos poses to building
occupants [is] insignificant' ") (quoting report of Ontario Royal Commission on Matters of
Health and Safety from the Use of Asbestos), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS)
9413, 9416 (Dec. 21, 1984).
48. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 18 (Aug.

31, 1982) (EPA not provided abatement guidance); see also Asbestos School Hazard Detection
and Control Act of 1980, 20 U.S.C. § 3601(b)(1) (1982). The Act directed a task force to
determine the extent of the hazard posed from the presence of friable asbestos in school buildings. See id.§ 3601(b)(1) (1980). The recently passed Asbestos School Hazard Abatement
Act of 1984 now requires the administrator of the EPA to develop criteria to ascertain the
extent of the hazard. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 401 l(b)(1) (West Supp. III 1984). In December 1984,
however, the EPA announced it would not issue standards for assessing the risk of asbestos
materials, nor would the agency set a level of risk, which if met, would require abatement or
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fendants are suggesting differing resolutions to the injury in fact issue.4 9
One argument supporting abatement is grounded on findings that
mesothelioma can be induced by low level, infrequent exposure to asbestos. 50
The findings suggest that even though exposure in schools is at a low level, it
is indeed hazardous enough to warrant abatement.5 1 Asbestos manufacturers argue, however, that it is incorrect to assume that injuries to some asbestos workers serve as a basis for concluding that an injury is present in a
school exposure setting. 2 Further, asbestos manufacturers contend that the
mere presence of friable asbestos does not automatically pose a risk.5 3 Con-

removal of the asbestos material. See EPA Declines to Assess Risks of Asbestos or Require
Abatement, ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. 9405 (Dec. 21, 1984).
49. Compare McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 33 ("any

exposure will increase the risk of cancer") with Asbestos Industry Is Likely to Spend More Time
in Court, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1980, at 22, col. 2 (asbestos manufacturer claims product in
schools not hazardous).
50. See Bertrand v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 529 F. Supp. 539, 544 (D. Minn. 1982)
(one exposure to asbestos dust or fiber may cause mesothelioma); G. PETERS & B. PETERS,
SOURCEBOOK ON ASBESTOS DISEASES: MEDICAL, LEGAL AND ENGINEERING ASPECTS, at
B7 (1980) (no threshold established to define reasonably safe exposure level; prevention of
mesothelioma best accomplished by avoiding asbestos exposure).
51. See McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SEH. BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 33 (airborne fiber
lower in school, but overall risk not reduced); Selikoff, Twenty Lessons from Asbestos, EPA J.,
May 1984, at 24. Selikoff suggests that a 55-year-old teacher in a school containing asbestos
materials with only 10 years of exposure faces risk; because of mesothelioma's propensities, it
is important to prevent exposure to children. See id. at 24.
For any one person risk is low. But for a school system, sheer numbers tell you that you
have a problem. . . . The optimists say the health risks of asbestos are tiny; the pessimists-including public health authorities-know some people are going to die from exposure to asbestos. And they would like to see schools help prevent those deaths-no
matter how few-by removing the risk.
McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD J., Apr. 1984, at 33, 34 (quoting Edwin C. Holstein, Clinical Assistant Professor, Environmental Science Laboratories of Mount Sinai School
of Medicine, New York).
52. See Common Questions of Fact Are at Core of Asbestos School Litigation, ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9403 (Dec. 21, 1984); Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States
Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace & Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 3, In re School Asbest6s Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L.
Dec. 6, 1984), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413 (Dec. 21, 1984). The
asbestos manufacturers attempt to distinguish between high-level, occupational exposure associated with personal injury actions and low-level, non-occupational exposure associated with
school actions. See id. at 3. The manufacturers claim that school officials, promoted by fears
emanating from "unsubstantiated-overgeneralizations" about the hazard of asbestos fiber, are
rushing to remove and replace asbestos material without first considering the actual exposure
level. See id. at 9, 10. Some medical experts agree with the asbestos manufacturers that the
risk from occupational exposure does not suggest an equal risk from non-occupational exposure. See Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning
News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1.
53. See Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace &
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sequently, the schools' burden of proving an injury in fact will not necessarily be easy to carry.
To establish that the presence of friable asbestos poses an actionable danger, a school board could request that a court take judicial notice that asbestos exposure creates a hazardous risk.5 4 The school district could offer
medical findings and prior case law to support this request. 5" Before a court
takes judicial notice of a fact, however, the matter must be beyond reasonable dispute.5 6 Thus, asbestos defendants could possibly succeed in arguing
that medical findings are too inconsistent to support judicial notice.5 7
As a second alternative, schools could use the congressional finding that
the presence of friable asbestos poses an unwarranted health hazard5 8 as
"weighty evidence" to establish that friable asbestos in schools constitutes a
public nuisance." Although a congressional finding does not establish the

Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 3, In re School
Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 6, 1984), reprintedin ASBESTOS
LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413 (DEc. 21, 1984); see also Asbestos Industry Is Likely to Spend

More Time in Court, Wall St. J., Apr. 16, 1984, at 22, col. 2 (asbestos manufacturer contends
"our product is not hazardous in schools and we plan to vigorously defend").
54. See FED. R. EvID. 201. Rule 201 allows a court to take judicial notice of a fact that is
"not subject to reasonable dispute" because it is "capable of accurate and ready determination
by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." See id. 201(b)(2).
55. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 93 (Sept. 21, 1981). The report characterizes the offered evidence as
"adjudicative medical fact." See id. at 93.
56. See FED. R. EvID. 201(b)(2) advisory committee note. "A high degree of indisputability is the essential prerequisite" for a court to take judicial notice. See id.
57. See Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 347-48 (5th Cir. 1982). In
Hardy, the Fifth Circuit reversed a lower court's judicial notice that asbestos causes cancer.
See id. at 348. The court cited issues, such as whether mesothelioma can arise without asbestos exposure and the incidence of cancer in the general population, to demonstrate the inappropriateness of taking judicial notice. See id. at 347-48. Asbestos defendants should be able
to demonstrate that the presence of friable asbestos creating a significant health hazard is open
to reasonable dispute. See Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools,
Dallas Morning News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1 (friable asbestos material in schools
not substantial enough to create serious hazard); Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States
Gypsum Co., and W.R. Grace & Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at 9,In re School Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L.
Dec. 6, 1984) (asbestos in building air rarely poses health threat to occupants), reprinted in
ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413, 9417 (DEC. 21, 1984).
58. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 401 l(a)(6) (West Supp. [II 1984). The specific language reads:
"(a) The Congress finds that. . .(6) the presence in school buildings of friable or easily damaged asbestos creates an unwarranted hazard to the health of the school children and school
employees who are exposed to such materials ...." Id.
59. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY RE-

PORT TO THE CONGRESS 167 (Sept. 21, 1981) (offer findings that presence of asbestos amounts

to hazardous condition). The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides circumstances that support a finding of interference with a public right. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

https://commons.stmarytx.edu/thestmaryslawjournal/vol16/iss4/9

14

Kincade: Issues in School Asbestos Hazard Abatement Litigation Symposium o

1985]

COMMENTS

will of Congress,' the declaration does offer guidance because of the importance of legislative findings and the "duty" of courts to recognize the policy
behind legislative enactments. 6 1 Once the presence of friable asbestos is considered a nuisance, it would then be necessary to initiate procedures designed
to eliminate the asbestos nuisance.62 The nuisance theory or any other theory based on the congressional finding is subject to limitation, however, due
to evidence disputing Congress' finding.63 Additionally, the Act itself disclaims any intent to effect the legal rights of parties in asbestos school
litigation."

§ 821B (1979). "Circumstances that may sustain a holding that an interference with a public
right is unreasonable include the following: (a) whether the conduct involves a significant
interference with the public health, the public safety, the public peace, the public comfort
. Id. § 821B(2)(a) (emphasis added).
60. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 290 (1936). In determining the effect of
congressional recitals, the Court stated the preambles "do not constitute an exertion of the will
of Congress which is legislation, but a recital of considerations which in the opinion of that
body existed and justified the expression of its will in the present act." See id. at 290.
61. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 163 (Sept. 21, 1981) (legislative finding has significant impact on
application of nuisance doctrine in context of asbestos litigation). Addressing the deference
owed to congressional findings, the United States Supreme Court held:
No doubt it is true that a legislative declaration of facts that are material only as the
ground for enacting a rule of law . . . may not be held conclusive by the Courts. But a
declaration by a legislature concerning public conditions that by necessity and duty it
must know, is entitled at least to great respect.
Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 154 (1921) (citations omitted). The Supreme Court has also
recognized that courts have a duty to effectuate the policy embedded within a statute, "not
only in matters of statutory construction but also in those of decisional law." See Moragne v.
State Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375, 390-91 (1970). Thus, the congressional findings could be
used to provide evidence that the hazard does, in fact, exist. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 163 (Sept. 21,
1981).
62. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 167 (Sept. 21, 1981). The report speaks in terms of legal redress. See
id. at 167.
63. See Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning
News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1. The article quotes noted medical professors and
researchers who dispute suggestions that the amount of friable asbestos material in schools
poses a serious health hazard. See id. at 29A, 30A, col. 1. The same conclusion, that no
discernable risk is posed, is also advanced in a report of the Ontario Royal Commission on
Matters of Health and Safety from the Use of Asbestos, which is quoted in part in a brief filed
by asbestos defendants. See Brief of National Gypsum Co., United States Gypsum Co., and
W.R. Grace & Co. in Support of Motion for Transfer for Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings at
9, In re School Asbestos Litigation, No. 2279-84-NG-8286 (J.P.M.D.L. Dec. 6, 1984), reprinted in ASBESTOS LITIG. REP. (ANDREWS) 9413, 9416 (Dec. 21, 1984).
64. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 4019 (West Supp. III 1984). Section 4019 states: "[N]othing in
this subchapter shall (1) affect the right of any party to seek legal redress in connection with
the purchase or installation of asbestos materials in schools or any claim of disability or death

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

15

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 16 [2022], No. 4, Art. 9

ST MAR Y'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 16:951

The existence of factual injury from friable asbestos materials in schools
could, perhaps, best be resolved on a case-by-case basis. 6, In such a manner,
the court would note the level of dust and fiber released in a school. The
judge or jury would then determine whether that level poses a risk to the
building's occupants, taking into consideration the relevant studies and
findings.
V. ESTABLISHING RECOVERY IN TORT FOR COSTS OF REMOVAL AND
REPLACEMENT OF ASBESTOS MATERIAL

In asbestos school litigation, the existence of an injury in fact, if proven,
stems from the asbestos product itself. Consequently, a products liability
action grounded in tort may provide a basis for recovery 66 by a school for
the cost of removal and replacement of the friable asbestos material. 67 Traditionally, recovery for the removal and replacement of a defective product
has been categorized as "economic loss," or compensation only for the value
related to exposure to asbestos in a school setting ...." Id. § 4019(1); accord U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 163
(Sept. 21, 1981). The report suggests that the congressional finding may be applied in the
nuisance context of establishing injury in fact without directly declaring the rights or liabilities
of the parties. See id. at 163.
65. Cf Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning
News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1. A medical professor stated that the amount of
material in the air, in most cases, would not present a need for abatement. See id. at 30A, col.
1. Thus, in some cases, the amount of asbestos released into the air would require abatement
procedures. Until specific standards are drafted for denoting a hazard and delineating when
abatement is necessary, which could be applied universally to all schools, the existence of
injury in fact will probably depend upon the court's determination.
66. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 677 (5th ed. 1984)
(products liability area of law involving liability of seller of goods for defects in product); id. at
678 (theories of recovery in tort). A products liability action in contract is an alternative to
recovery in tort. See id. at 678 (products actions recoverable under strict liability or negligence
in contract, or strict liability or negligence in tort). A contract action, however, is undesirable
because stringent defenses and limited theories of recovery restrict the potential for recovery.
See Memorandum by Michael E. Gurley, Attorney at Law 1 (under cover letter addressed to
John P. Kincade dated Jan. 18, 1985) Mr. Gurley currently represents the State of Ohio and
the Ohio Department of Mental Health as special state counsel in a suit against asbestos manufacturers for abatement costs for a state mental hospital. He suggests that the amount of
damages would be limited to those damages contemplated by the parties when the contract
was made. In addition, any recovery obtained is subject to "drastic limitation" by the terms of
any warranties covering the asbestos material, agreements between the parties, and any action
by the school in contributing to the hazardous condition. See id. at 1.
67. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 4015(c)(1)(a)-(c) (West Supp. III 1984). In the Asbestos School
Hazard Abatement Act of 1984, the United States Congress contemplates abating the threat,
replacing the asbestos, and restoring the school buildings. See id. § 4015. Over 85 school
districts and school boards have instituted suits to recover the asbestos hazard abatement
costs. See Silas, Asbestos-free, 71 A.B.A. J., Apr. 1985, 22, 22.
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of the defective product itself.68 Although physical injury to person and
property is recoverable in a strict products liability action grounded in tort,
compensation for damage confined to the product is usually held not recoverable 69 because of Uniform Commercial Code applicability.7" Thus, to recover removal and replacement costs in tort, a school must establish that
injury to the asbestos product constitutes a physical injury rather than economic loss. 7 1 To establish physical injury, schools could propose that the
presence of the asbestos material constitutes injury to persons, or that the
hazard abatement procedures damage property other than the defective
product itself.7 2 In addition, even if a court determines that damage to persons or collateral property is not present, policy considerations suggest compensation under tort as property damage when the injury, although confined
to the asbestos product itself, is occasioned by an unreasonably dangerous
product, as opposed to a merely defective product.7 3

68. See, e.g., Note, Economic Loss in Products Liability Jurisprudence, 66 COLUM. L.
REV. 917, 918 (1966) (direct economic loss measurable by repair and replacement costs); Com-

ment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 40 (1976) (damage
to product itself constitutes economic loss measured by cost of replacement); Note, Economic
Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Between Contract and
Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118, 118 (1978) (economic damage compensating for harm to
product).
69. See Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29,
39-40 (1976) (economic loss recoverable in non-implied warranty actions but not strict liability); Note, Economic Losses and Strict ProductsLiability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118, 118 (1978) (economic loss limited to
breach of warranty cases).
70. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95A, at 680 (5th ed. 1984)
(UCC exclusive source for liability if claim arises from intangible economic loss).
71. Cf Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 464 (Alaska 1983) (allowing tort recovery
for cost of removal and replacement of dangerous insulation).
72. See Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp.
855, 859 (D.N.J. 1982). In overruling the asbestos defendant's motion to dismiss, the court
ruled that recovery for replacing acoustical plaster containing asbestos "technically" fell
within property damage under tort because the asbestos caused the entire ceiling to be worthless. See id. at 859.
73. See W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 677-78 (5th ed.
1984). A product's loss due to its dangerous condition is a "product hazard," while loss because of an inferior condition is a product defect. See id. at 677-78. The policies of deterring
dangerous conduct and imposing a burden on the seller are the same whether an unreasonably
dangerous product injures "persons, other property, or the product itself." See Mid Continent
Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 317 (Tex. 1978) (Pope, J.,
dissenting); see also Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165,
1173 (3d Cir. 1981) ("Tort law imposes duty on manufacturers to produce safe items, regardless of whether the ultimate impact of the hazard is on people, other property, or the product
itself.").
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Physical Harm Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A

As provided in section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a seller
of a product in a defective condition that is unreasonably dangerous to the
user or to the user's property is subject to strict liability in tort for physical
harm.7 4 Damage to the product itself because of its own defect, however, is
usually not included within the scope of strict products liability in tort.7 5
Thus, in order to fall within 402A's scope of liability, the schools may be
required to establish that the defective asbestos product injures persons and
property other than the product itself.76 To demonstrate the applicability of
402A, school boards could argue that friable asbestos products are defective
because of carcenogenic propensities, that such propensities render the asbestos material unreasonably dangerous, and that such a defect and danger
have resulted in physical harm.7 7 Asbestos school plaintiffs could establish
the physical harm requirement in either of two ways-harm to the school
building's occupants or physical harm to the school building itself. 7 8

74. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (Special Liability of Seller of
Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer). Section 402A states:
(I) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product,
and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
75. See, e.g., Fredonia Broadcasting Corp. v. R.C.A. Corp., 481 F.2d 781, 797 (5th Cir.
1973) (strict liability not applicable to economic loss); Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co.,
391 F. Supp. 962, 971 & n.9 (D. Ariz. 1975) (in Ariz., Cal., Hawaii, Tex., and Alaska economic loss not recoverable under Restatement strict liability action), af'd, 541 F.2d 276 (9th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45
Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (economic loss not recoverable under strict liability in tort). But see
Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 313 (N.J. 1965) (carpet defect recoverable
in tort liability). See generally Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13
IDAHO L. REV. 29, 40 (1976) (economic loss not recoverable in strict liability).
76. Cf Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (strict
liability in tort limited to physical harm to property or person); Mid Continent Aircraft Corp.
v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Tex. 1978) (strict liability applies to
personal injuries and damage to other property in Tex.).
77. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 99 (Sept. 21, 1981) (allege asbestos hazardous because carcinogen).
78. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) (strict liability for seller causing harm to user or user's property).
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1. Injury to Person
A claim by school boards for harm to the user could be based on the
medical hazards associated with exposure to friable asbestos. 79 Asbestos defendants, however, could counter that physical harm to the students, teachers, and employees is not sufficiently proven because no conclusive medical
evidence exists to establish that non-occupational exposure to friable asbestos is hazardous," ° and no cases of disease associated with exposure in
schools have been documented."1 Establishing physical harm to the occupants is possible, however, since evidence has concluded that asbestos is
carcenogenic,8 2 and numerous findings and studies indicate that the presence
of friable asbestos in schools is hazardous enough to warrant abatement.8 3
Further, courts in England have held that waiting until actual physical harm
is documented is unnecessary when the potential for injury exists.84 American courts concur.85 Thus, school boards could satisfy the physical harm
79. See Westbrook, See You in Court, AM. SCH. & U., Jan. 1984, at 14 (asbestos materials
cause and will cause serious injury to students and school personnel); Oversight Hearings on

Asbestos Health Hazards to School Children: Hearingson H.R. 1435 and H.R. 1524 Before the
Subcomm. on Elementary, Secondary, and Vocational Education of the House of Representa-

tives Comm. on Education and Labor, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 298 (1979) (cancer risk from exposure greater in children).
80. Cf Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning
News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 29A, 30A, col. 1 (friable asbestos material in schools not substantial
enough to create serious hazard).
81. See id. at 29A (no documented case of person contracting asbestosis); see also Westbrook, See You in Court, AM. SCH. & U., Jan. 1984, at 14-15 (disease-related exposure only
now beginning to appear). But see Asbestos Scare That Stalks the Schools, 96 U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REP., Mar. 26, 1984, at 13 (estate of former teacher suing asbestos manufacturers over
death caused by mesothelioma).
82. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 1 (Aug.
31, 1982) (citing finding of World Health Organization's International Agency for Research on

Cancer that asbestos one of 18 "chemicals known to cause cancer in humans").
83. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 4011 (a)(6) (West Supp. III 1984) (presence of asbestos unwarranted health hazard); id. § 4011 (b)(3) (purpose to provide assistance for abatement); 40
C.F.R. § 763 (1984) (exposure in schools increases risk of developing cancer); see also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ASBESTOS IN SCHOOLS: A DILEMMA 2 (Aug. 31, 1982) (discussing Environmental Defense Fund finding that asbestos in schools poses unreasonable danger of

injury).
84. See Anns v. London Borough, [1977] 2 ALL. E.R. 492, 514 (damages constituting
potential danger because of defect are recoverable) (Lord Salmon); Dutton v. Bognor Regis
United Building Co., [1972] ALL. E.R. 462, 474 (defect discovered before injury, defendant
surely liable for cost of repair) (Lord Denning Mr.); J. FLEMMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 50506 & n.18 (5th ed. 1977) (citing English cases as support for recovery for averting potential
danger). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT TO THE CONGRESS Ill (Sept. 21, 1981) (arguing for application of English
cases to asbestos school issues).
85. See Gladiola Biscuit Co. v. Southern Ice Co., 267 F.2d 138, 140 (5th Cir. 1959) (defendant liable for costs even though physical harm prevented); Northern Power & Eng'g Corp.
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requirement by showing that medical hazards associated with exposure to
friable asbestos are present and that such hazards constitute physical harm
to the user, even though the exposure has not yet manifested into documented cases of disease.
2.

Injury to Collateral Property

A second manner of establishing physical harm in order to come within
section 402A's scope of strict liability is to demonstrate damage or injury to
property other than the defective or dangerous product.86 Asbestos school
plaintiffs could argue that the physical act of ripping out and tearing away
the asbestos material from other parts of the school building reflects damage
to property other than the product itself.87 In an analogous situation, however, involving the removal of flammable insulation from public buildings,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed a judgment holding that procedures initiated for
the removal of the insulation, which damaged parts of the building structure,
did not constitute an injury within tort strict liability recovery. 88 Conversely, a more recent decision from the Alaska Supreme Court held that
where the plaintiff destroyed part of a wall in removing dangerous insulation, physical damage to property is measurable by the cost of repairing the

v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 329 n. 10 (Alaska 1981) (recovery for creating potentially dangerous situation); see also Comment, Strict Liability. Recovery of "Economic" Loss,
13 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 49 (1976) (allow recovery for damage defective product likely to cause).
But see Trans World Airlines v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 148 N.Y.S.2d 284, 290 (Sup. Ct. 1955)
(no wrong if danger averted). Trans World Airlines is criticized on policy grounds for not
effecting a policy favoring deterrence of harm-threatening conduct. See Note, Economic Loss
in Products Liability Jurisprudence,66 COLUM. L. REV. 917, 951 (1966) (policy of deterrence
applicable where product causes unreasonable danger).
86. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965); Note, Economic Losses and
Strict Products Liability: A Record of Judicial Confusion Between Contractand Tort, 54 NoTRE DAME LAW. 118, 118 (1978) (recovery under tort strict products liability for property
damage other than to defective product).
87. See Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 464 (Alaska 1983). Court determined that
destroying walls in order to reach defective and dangerous insulation constituted property
damage. See id. at 464. Another court ruling on the issue found that removing the asbestos
material also required removing parts of the ceiling, which constituted property damage. See
Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F. Supp. 855, 863
(D.N.J. 1982) (overruling defendant's motion to dismiss).
88. See Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962, 971 (D. Ariz. 1975),
afl'd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 915 (1977). The court held that
removal of the insulation represented mere consequential damage stemming from the product's failure to meet performance expectations. See id. at 972. However, in a more recent
decision from within the Ninth Circuit, a court determined whether removal and replacement
of flammable insulation constituted "property damage," thereby activating an insurer's duty to
defend. The court stated that repair and removal of the insulation did not involve the issue of
property damage, but concerned the issue of damages incurred by the property damage. See
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. PPG Indus., 554 F. Supp. 290, 293, 294 (D. Ariz. 1983).
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damaged structure.8 9 This latter view appears more reasonable since damage to the school building structure from removal procedures or contamination within the structure occasioned by falling asbestos should be recognized
as property damage. If, however, an asbestos school plaintiff is unsuccessful
in establishing an injury to persons or collateral property, policy arguments
suggest that even when damage is contained to the product itself, such injury
should be compensated in tort as property damage when caused by a hazardous defect. 9°

B.

Injury Confined to the Product as Property Damage Within § 402A

In the absence of injury to persons or other property, courts have historically denied recovery in tort for damage to a product occasioned by its own
defect. 91 In denying recovery, courts have focused primarily on the type of
damage alleged-cost of repair or replacement, loss of use, and inadequate
value-and have concluded that such losses are best compensated by Uniform Commercial Code provisions regarding the rights of parties to a sales
transaction. 92 Focusing solely on the type of damage alleged, however, fails
to consider the risk posed and the manner in which the injury arose. 93 Recently, the focus has shifted from the type of damage incurred to the nature
89. See Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 464 (Alaska 1983). The court stated that
the critical issue is whether "the product is dangerously defective, and whether the dangerous
defect caused the property damage alleged by the [plaintiffs]." See id. at 464 (emphasis added).
90. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY
REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 108 (Sept. 21, 1981) (refers to damage contained to dangerous
product as economic loss and suggests recovery in tort); J. FLEMMING, LAW OF TORTS 505-06
(5th ed. 1977) (if product threatens injury, plaintiff ought to recover at least cost of averting
injury); Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 41
(1976) (plaintiff should recover all damages for defective product if it has potential for causing
harm). But see Keeton, PrivateLaw, Torts, 32 Sw. L.J. 1, 5 (1978) (harmful product damaging
only itself irrelevant to tort).
91. See Comment, Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29,
40-41 (1976) (some courts allow tort recovery for only collateral property damage and personal injury); Note, Economic Losses and Strict Products Liability: A Record of JudicialConfusion Between Contract and Tort, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 118, 118 (1978) (majority of courts
restrict economic loss recovery to warranty law).
92. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 626 F.2d 280, 289
(3d Cir. 1980). Applying strict liability in economic loss areas would supersede § 2-316 of the
UCC. See id. at 289. Section 2-316 provides a warranty will not be negated or limited where
such construction is unreasonable. See U.C.C. § 2-316(1) (1978); see also Clark v. International Harvester Co., 581 P.2d 784, 793 (Idaho 1978) (legislatures expressed intent in adopting
UCC; court must accommodate common law evolution of tort with UCC principles). See
generally U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S ASBESTOS LIABILITY REPORT

TO THE CONGRESS 100, 106 (Sept. 21, 1981) (noting courts application of UCC preclusion to
recovery).
93. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173
(3d Cir. 1981) ("items for which damages are sought ... are not determinative"); Comment,
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of the risk the defective product poses when determining whether the injury
is compensable as property damage in tort. 94 In allowing recovery in tort for
damages confined to the product itself, courts have noted a distinction between the type of damage to a defective product that reflects mere economic
loss and the type of injury that amounts to harm traditionally compensable
in tort." Such a distinction has direct application to asbestos school litigation. Schools could seek recovery for the cost of removing and replacing the
asbestos material based on the risk associated with the asbestos product
rather than defects in value or quality. 96 In recent decisions, the Alaska
Supreme Court has noted a distinction between a merely defective product
and a product creating a risk, when determining if compensation for the
product lies in tort.9 7
In Cloud v. Kit ManufacturingCo., 9'the Alaska Supreme Court held that
fire damage to the plaintiff's mobile home caused by flammable rug padding
reflected property damage recoverable in tort rather than economic loss for
the product itself. 99 In distinguishing property damage from economic loss,

Strict Liability: Recovery of "Economic" Loss, 13 IDAHO L. REV. 29, 43 (1976) (strict liability
frustrated when damages awarded based on type of damage incurred).
94. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173
(3d Cir. 1981). It is important to note that the textual discussion focuses upon compensating
for the injury to the product itself. Some courts, bound by precedent holding that economic
loss is not recoverable under strict liability in tort, classify injury to the product itself as property damage in order to facilitate its recovery in tort. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548
P.2d 279, 285-86 (Alaska 1976) (economic loss not recoverable under strict liability in tort);
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (damage confined to defectively dangerous product constituted property damage recoverable under strict liability in tort).
Whether the damage is classified as economic loss or property damage, the issue focuses upon
recovery for damage confined to the defective product.
95. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1169
(3d Cir. 1981) (defects of quality are economic, whereas dangerous defects are physical injury);
Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska 1981)
(distinction between products failing to meet economic expectations and products defective
because of creation of hazardous condition).
96. Cf W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 95, at 677-78 (5th ed.

1984). A recovery would be based on the "product hazard" of the asbestos material. See id. at
677.
97. See, eg., Shooshanian v. Wagner, 672 P.2d 455, 463 (Alaska 1983) (distinction between defective product and damages resulting in injury); Northern Power & Eng'g Corp. v.
Caterpillar Tractor Co., 623 P.2d 324, 328 (Alaska 1981) (difference between products which
fail to meet economic expectations and which break down in foreseeably hazardous manner);
Cloud v. Kit Mfg. Co., 563 P.2d 248, 251 (Alaska 1977) (direct property damage versus internal breakage, and depreciation).
98. 563 P.2d 248 (Alaska 1977).
99. See id. at 251. The plaintiffs brought suit against Kit after the rug pad ignited and
caused their home to burn. See id. at 249. The plaintiffs alleged that the rug pad was defective
because of its flammable nature. Further, the plaintiffs alleged that the mobile home itself was
also a defective product. See id.at 249.
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the court noted that "sudden and calamitous" damage will usually result in
property damage while "deterioration, internal breakage and depreciation"
will reflect economic loss." ° ° The court based its decision on the policy that

a manufacturer should bear the risk of an unsafe product it markets. 1 ' The
court reaffirmed the Cloud distinction between merely defective and dangerous products in Northern Power & EngineeringCorp. v. CaterpillarTractor
Co. 102 In Northern, the court refused to classify damage to a malfunctioning
diesel generator as property damage because the defective product failed to
create a situation potentially hazardous to other property or persons.10 3 Be-

cause contract law concerns reasonable economic expectations, and tort law
concerns the safety of products and the care required from a manufacturer,
strict liability in tort is employed only when the defective product endangers
person or property.""° The court added that recovery in tort is permissible
even if the damage is confined to the product itself as long as the potential

danger exists.'
In classifying economic loss and property damage, the "lemon" versus
unsafe product distinction adopted by the Alaska court is analogous to asbestos school litigation. School boards are not seeking recovery for abatement because the asbestos product is a lemon, in that the products fail to
insulate or retard fire properly. "06 Rather, schools are seeking recovery for
the cost of removal and replacement because the product is unsafe and poses
100. See id. at 251. The Cloud court noted that a distinction between economic loss and
property damage is not always clear cut, especially when the action seeks recovery for cost of
replacement or repair to the defective product itself. See id. at 251. In distinguishing between
economic loss and property damage, courts should heed the purposes underlying UCC warranty actions. The court distinguished Cloud from an earlier case involving mobile home defects, characterizing the earlier owner's home as a "lemon," while the Clouds were exposed to
an unsafe product. See id. at 251.
101. See id. at 250. The court, in imposing liability on the manufacturer, quoted from its
earlier decision in Clary v. Fifth Ave. Chrysler Center, 454 P.2d 244, 248 (Alaska 1969):
"'The purpose of imposing strict liability on the manufacturer and retailer is to insure that the
cost of injuries resulting from the defective products are borne by the manufacturers that put
such products on the market rather than by the injured persons who are powerless to protect
themselves.'" See id. at 250.
102. 623 P.2d 324, 329-30 (Alaska 1981).
103. See id. at 329-30. The Northern court expanded upon the Cloud distinction, stating
that "sudden and calamitous" damage is not necessary for property damage, although property damage is likely to be found in such instances. See id. at 328 & n.5. The court further
described the distinction between economic loss and property damage as the difference between "disappointed users and endangered ones." See id. at 328.
104. See id. at 328.
105. See id. at 329. The defective product itself must create the potential danger. See id.
at 329.
106. See Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum Co., 552 F.
Supp. 855, 859 (D.N.J. 1982) (problem other than product's failure in suit for removal of
asbestos product).
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a health hazard."17 In such a situation, the principles of tort should govern
compensation.'
Further, assuming that schools can prove that asbestos
exposure is hazardous, recovery in tort is warranted because, even though no
cases of disease are reported, the potential for danger exists.109 A recent
decision of the Third Circuit includes the lemon versus unsafe product distinction, but expands to also include other factors when determining
whether recovery for a defective product sounds in tort or contract.110
In Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. CaterpillarTractor Co., 111 the Third
Circuit held that the type of damages sought, such as cost of replacement or
repair, is not controlling when deciding if damage to a product allegedly
caused by a hazardous defect constitutes economic loss or property damage.'l2 Rather, a court must analyze interrelated factors, including "the nature of the defect, the type of risk, and the manner in which the injury
arose," to determine whether recovery sounds in tort or contract." 3 The
Third Circuit found that these factors control whether "the safety-insurance
policy of tort" or "the expectation-bargain protection policy of warranty
law" is most applicable to the claim." 4 In applying these factors, the Pennsylvania Glass court concluded that fire damage to a hydraulic loader, for
which the plaintiff sought replacement costs, reflected property damage re-

107. See id. at 859 (suit because asbestos product defect poses grave personal safety risk);
see also County of Johnson v. United States Gypsum Co., 580 F. Supp. 284, 287-88 (E.D.
Tenn. 1984) (suit by school board for recovery for alleviating dangerous condition caused by
asbestos product). Both actions involved the defendants' motion to dismiss, rather than a trial
on the merits. See id. at 287; Cinnaminson Township Bd. of Educ. v. United States Gypsum
Co., 552 F. Supp. 855, 856-57 (D.N.J. 1982).
108. See J. FLEMMING, THE LAW OF TORTS 506 (5th ed. 1977) (tort law concerned with
dangerous, not merely inferior, products).
109. See id. at 505-06 (plaintiff recovered costs of making dangerous product safe,
thereby averting injury). But see W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 101, at
710 (5th ed. 1984) (no apparent support for allowing tort recovery for making dangerous product safe before accident occurs).
110. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173
(3d Cir. 1981) (enunciates factors to determine if tort applicable).
111. 652 F.2d 1165 (3d Cir. 1981).
112. See id. at 1173. The court identified the majority approach as determining whether
an injury represents economic damage or physical damage to the defective product. See id. at
1173.
113. See id. at 1173. In developing these analytical factors, the court noted trends and
principles of other courts in addressing the recovery-action issue. See id. at 1172. Most courts
recognize that warranty principles "remain the appropriate vehicle to redress" the unfulfilled
expectations of a buyer when a product's defect renders it inferior or unable to accomplish its
intended function. See id. at 1172. Conversely, courts further recognize that a "benefit-of-thebargain approach" is inadequate when compensating for the effects of hazardous products
causing injury. See id. at 1172. Manufacturers are in a better position to "bear the risk" or
initiate measures designed to alleviate the defects posing danger. See id. at 1172.
114. See id. at 1173.
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coverable under strict liability in tort.115
By applying the Pennsylvania Glass factors to asbestos school litigation, a
plaintiff could suggest that the cost for removal and replacement of the friable asbestos material is also recoverable in tort. First, a school could argue
that the nature of the defect stems from a product containing asbestos and
the manufacturer's failure to warn of its hazards. Second, the risk of disease
and contamination of the school building illustrates the type of risk the asbestos product poses. Third, an asbestos school plaintiff could argue that
injury arose in the form of an assault-a continuous invasion of hazardous
asbestos fibers into the breathing air within the school.' 16 Each of the Pennsylvania Glass factors, when applied to asbestos school litigation, demonstrates a clear alignment with the tort policy of recovery for an unreasonable
risk, even though the injury may be confined to the product itself, rather
than recovery for unfulfilled expectations of contract." 7 Recovery in tort
based upon loss of the product itself due to dangerous defects is important in
asbestos school litigation. Although the asbestos product may be found hazardous, a court may be unwilling to find a personal injury since no cases of
disease are reported." 8 Further, the court may conclude that removing and
replacing the asbestos does not damage collateral property.' 9 Thus, recovery for the product itself remains an important alternative.

115. See id. at 1174-75. Caterpillar argued that since the damage was confined to the
product only, economic loss applied. See id. at 1175. The court, however, established that the
nature of the defect, faulty design failing to contain a fire, reflected a hazard falling within tort
policy that a manufacturer bear the risk of dangerous products. See id. at 1174-75. The fire
risk posed by the defect is also usually compensated in tort. See id. at 1174. In contrast,
Pennsylvania Glass did not allege that the loader was unfit for its intended purpose or of poor
quality. See id. at 1175. Such allegations are usually associated with contract-warranty recovery. See id. at 1175. In dismissing the applicability of warranty recovery, the court stated that
purchasers are not required to bargain for safe products because the law imposes a duty on
manufacturers to provide safe items. See id. at 1175.
116. See id. at 1173 (naming factors to analyze when determining whether tort or contract governs); see also Memorandum by Michael E. Gurley, Attorney at Law, 3 (under cover
letter addressed to John P. Kincade dated Jan. 15, 1985) (Mr. Gurley currently represents the
State of Ohio and the Ohio Department of Mental Health as special state counsel in a suit
against asbestos manufacturers for abatement costs for a state mental hospital).
117. See Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 117273 (3d Cir. 1981) (manufacturers better able to bear risk of dangerous product, therefore, tort
imposes duty whether hazard ultimately impacts people, other property, or product itself).
118. See Schulte & Stutz, Experts Say Asbestos Harm Unlikely in Schools, Dallas Morning News, Oct. 31, 1982, at 30A, col. 1 (no case of disease from school asbestos exposure
established). But see McCormick, Asbestos, 171 AM. SCH. BOARD J., Apr., 1984, at 33 (health
authorities realize people will die from asbestos exposure in schools).
119. See Arizona v. Cook Paint & Varnish Co., 391 F. Supp. 962, 971 (D. Ariz 1975)
(removal of dangerously flammable insulation mere consequential damage flowing from product's failure to meet expectations), afd, 541 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
915 (1977).
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Recovery in Texas

An asbestos school plaintiff in Texas, however, does not possess the benefit
of recovering for damage confined to the product itself in tort strict liability. 120 To recover under Texas law, a school must demonstrate that the as12 1
bestos product caused physical injury other than to the product itself.
This requirement emanates from developments peculiar to Texas products
liability law. In Nobility Homes of Texas v. Shivers, 22 the Texas Supreme
Court refused to allow recovery in tort strict liability for qualitative defects
of a mobile home which a jury determined were not unreasonably dangerous. 123 Nobility Homes is consistent with the general rule that mere economic loss is not recoverable in tort. 124 Although a jury did find that the
absence of an engine lock plate rendered a crop-dusting plan unreasonably
dangerous, the supreme court, in Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry
County Spraying Services, 125 refused to allow recovery for damage to the
plane in tort strict liability. 126 Adopting Dean Keeton's argument that damage confined solely to the product is irrelevant to tort policy, the court concluded this type of damage is a loss of the "benefit-of-the-bargain."' 2 7

120. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308,
313 (Tex. 1978) (when loss to product itself, legislature has provided for compensation in law
of sales and contract).
121. See Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Prods., 572 S.W.2d 320, 325 (Tex. 1978).
When loss to the product also involves collateral property damage, recovery under tort strict
liability is available. See id. at 325.
122. 557 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977).
123. See id. at 80. A jury found the mobile home was defective as to materials and workmanship and was not fit for its intended use. See id. at 78. The jury further determined that
the defects were not unreasonably dangerous, which was a necessary prerequisite to allowing
recovery in tort strict liability. See id. at 79-80.
124. See, e.g., Morrow v. New Moon Homes, 548 P.2d 279, 285 (Alaska 1976) (qualitative defect recoverable under UCC); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151, 45 Cal.
Rptr. 17, 23 (1965) (commercial losses not compensated under strict liability); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 544 P.2d 983, 989 (Colo. 1975) (strict liability in tort does not cover business or commercial loss). But see Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 207 A.2d 305, 311-12
(N.J. 1965) (loss to goods or other property borne by maker who put them in stream of commerce); Iacono v. Anderson Concrete Corp., 326 N.E.2d 267, 270-71 (Ohio 1975) (recovery
for defective concrete actionable in tort strict liability); City of La Crosse v. Schubert, Schroeder & Assocs., 240 N.W.2d 124, 127 (Wisc. 1976) (strict liability in tort available for pure
economic loss claim).
125. 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978).
126. See id. at 312-13. Curry's plane, purchased from Mid Continent, crashed while
spraying insecticide. See id. at 310. The pilot escaped injury, and damage was limited to the
plane itself. See id. at 310.
127. See id. at 312. The Mid Continent court characterized the factual situation as involving an unreasonably dangerous product causing injury only to itself, not persons or property. See id. at 311. The court reasoned that the UCC, adopted by the Texas Legislature,
defines the rights of parties to a sales transaction and should not be "nullified" by expanding
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Justice Pope dissented and argued that the policy reasons of deterring dangerous conduct and imposing a duty of care upon a seller are the same in an
action involving a dangerous product, whether the injury is manifested in a
person, other property, or the product itself. 2 With Mid Continent, Texas
stands as the only jurisdiction to expressly refuse to allow recovery in tort
for injury solely to the product, even when 1such
29 injury is caused by an unreasonably dangerous defect of the product.
On the same day as Mid Continent, however, the court, in Signal Oil &
Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products,130 held that recovery for a dangerously
defective product may be had in a tort strict liability action when such defect
also causes collateral property damage.' 3' Thus, in order to recover in
Texas under tort for the cost of removing and replacing the asbestos product, an asbestos school plaintiff must demonstrate injury to person or property other than the product itself. Collateral property damage, incurred in
removing the asbestos material, is perhaps the stronger allegation since it is
more readily proven than a personal injury, which a court could determine
has not yet manifested itself.
Vl. CONCLUSION

Although asbestos has provided great utility in construction, it has also
provided great danger. The danger to school children, teachers, and employees becomes clearer as more information concerning hazards of asbestos
exposure becomes known. Once the presence of asbestos materials within a
school is established, it becomes the duty of school officials to seriously conthe doctrine of strict liability in tort. See id. at 312. Further, the only loss suffered, cost of
repair and loss of use, is limited to that which was involved in the sales transaction. See id. at
313. But see Pennsylvania Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1173
(3d Cir. 1981) (type of loss not determinative, but rather "nature of defect, type of risk, and
manner in which injury arose").
128. See Mid Continent Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., 572 S.W.2d 308,
317 (Pope, J., dissenting). Justice Pope reasoned that removing "property" from strict liability
coverage is an arbitrary distinction. See id. at 317. Further precedent has held that the absence of a finding of "unreasonably dangerous" precluded recovery in tort, thus, an unreasonably dangerous finding should be compensated in tort. See id. at 315.
129. See Blant & Watson, Property Damage Caused By Defective Products: What Losses
Are Recoverable 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1, 14 (1984) (Texas only state refusing recovery

for injury to product, even if resulting from unreasonably dangerous defect); Pennsylvania
Glass Sand Corp. v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 652 F.2d 1165, 1172 n.22 (3d Cir. 1981) (only one

state rejects theory that damage to product itself resulting from hazardous defect recoverable
in tort).
130. 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex. 1978).
131. See id. at 325. Damages to the product, when co-existing with other property damage, are recoverable under strict liability in tort or as consequential damages under the Texas
Business and Commerce Code § 2.715. See id. at 325; see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.715 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
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sider appropriate hazard abatement measures. School officials must also
consider how to best cover the cost of abatement procedures. If recovery
from an asbestos manufacturer, through litigation, is attempted, the issues of
the manufacturer's knowledge of the asbestos hazard in schools, the corresponding duty to warn, the existence of an injury in fact, and the recovery
for damages under tort are certain to arise. Although these issues will be
resolved at trial, evidence and principles of law and policy suggest that each
resolution should favor the schools.
Relevant evidence suggests that asbestos manufacturers, at least, should
have known of the hazard from exposure in schools before they began warning in the mid-1960's. Further, because of asbestos' carcenogenic propensities which can be triggered by low-level exposure, a definite redressable
injury does exist. Finally, the asbestos injury emanates from a dangerous,
hazardous product, exposing a risk to person and property. For these reasons and others, schools should recover for the damage in tort, whether the
damage is classified as personal, collateral property, or property damage
confined to the asbestos material itself.
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